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flict exists, can do little to promote uniformity in the law. These shortcomings may, however, do much to lighten the supreme court's work
load by discouraging deserving litigants from seeking supreme court
review of conflicting decisions.
LARRY C. LINDER

THE EXPANSION OF STATE POWER THROUGH THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
Following public hearings which revealed numerous incidents of
sexual conduct between dancers and customers 1 in bars licensed and
regulated by the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
the Department promulgated regulations expressly prohibiting sexual live
entertainment and films in such bars and nightclubs. Plaintiffs, including
holders of various liquor licenses issued by the Department, and dancers
at premises operated by such licensees, unsuccessfully sought discretionary review of the regulations in both the state court of appeals and in
the Supreme Court of California. The Department then joined with
plaintiff-petitioners in requesting the three-judge federal district court
to decide whether the regulations were invalid under the United States
Constitution. The district court held that the regulations unconstitutionally abridged the freedoms guaranteed to petitioners by the first and
fourteenth amendments. 2 The United States Supreme Court held, reversed:
States have broad latitude under the twenty-first amendment to control
the manner and circumstances under which liquor in bars and nightclubs
may be dispensed. The Department's conclusion that both the sale of
liquor and lewd or naked entertainment should not take place simultaneously in licensed establishments was not irrational nor was the
prophylactic solution unreasonable. California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390

(1972).
The Court, while admitting that the regulation would prevent certain activities which would not be obscene under Roth v. United States,8
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, granted the state agency wide
latitude to suppress not only obscenity outside the scope of the first
amendment, but also speech which is clearly protected. 4 In justifying
1. The Court summarized the transcript of the hearings by stating:
Customers were found engaging in oral copulation with women entertainers;
customers engaged in public masturbation; and customers placed rolled currency
either directly into the vagina of a female entertainer, or on the bar in order that
she might pick it up herself.
California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 393 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as LaRue].
2. California v. LaRue, 326 F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
3. 354 U.S. 476 (1957) [hereinafter referred as Roth].
4. The obscenity test developed in Roth requires that the material must be taken as a
whole and when so viewed, must appeal to a prurient interest in sex, patently offend
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such a result, the Court employed a line of commerce clause cases in which
the broad sweep of the twenty-first amendmen was recognized.' The
significance of this decision rests on the fact that the Court's interpretation of the twenty-first amendment extends power to the states to regulate
liquor in a manner which would otherwise be constitutionally impermissible.
Historically, there was a recurring confrontation between state
regulation of liquor under the twenty-first amendment and the limitations imposed upon the states by the constitutional grant to Congress
of power over foreign and interstate commerce. States' efforts to restrict
the importation of alcoholic beverages were rendered ineffective on the
basis of the commerce clause 7 by the Court in 1890.1 Congress reacted
to the Court's suggestion that only with congressional approval could
the states be permitted to regulate interstate commerce in liquor, by
enacting the Wilson Act.' The Act authorized state control of intoxicating liquors "upon arrival" into the state for use, sale or storage. Shortly
thereafter, the Court construed "upon arrival" to mean actual receipt
by the consignee, thereby permitting an extensive evasion of the prohibition laws by shipping directly to the consumer. 10 Congress responded
by passing the Webb-Kenyon Act," which originally was entitled "An
Act divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain
instances. 1 2 The statute prohibited the interstate transportation of intoxicating beverages when the intended receipt, possession, sale or use was
in violation of the laws of the receiving state.
The twenty-first amendment, repealing national prohibition and
authorizing the states to regulate liquor in a fashion which previously
had been constitutionally prohibited, was ratified in 1933.18 The resultant
community standards relating to the depiction of sexual matters, and be utterly without
redeeming social value. The Court recognized that the conduct there proscribed was not
obscene under these standards and was therefore within the protection of the first amendment. While the Court in LaRue drew the distinction that the regulations were upheld not
in the context of censorship but rather in the context of licensing bars to sell liquor by the
drink, Mr. Justice Marshall noted in his dissent that the legislative history pertaining to
the regulations indicated that California adopted them for the specific purpose of evading
the obscenity standards. 93 S. Ct. at 395, 401 n.4.
S. In addition to repealing Prohibition, the amendment in its second section reads:
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
6. 93 S. Ct. at 395-97.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, provides that Congress shall have the power "[tlo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
8. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
9. 26 Stat. 313 (1890), 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1934). The Court validated the Act in In re
Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
10. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898).
11. 37 Stat. 699 (1913), 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1939).
12. 27 U.S.C.A. § 122 (Supp. 1973).
13. The eighteenth amendment, which forbade "the manufacture, sale, or transportation
of intoxicating liquors," was ratified in 1919. The net result of the twenty-first amendment
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controversy as to the purpose and scope of the amendment has revolved
around two basic positions. It has been argued that the legislative and
judicial history preceding the amendment and the almost exact duplication of the language of the Webb-Kenyon Act 14 indicated merely an
intention to enable those states which wished to do so to remain "dry."
In his dissenting opinion in LaRue, Mr. Justice Marshall, a proponent
of this historical purpose view, stated:
But the Amendment by its terms speaks only to state control
of the importation of alcohol, and its legislative history makes
clear that it was intended only to permit "dry" States to control
the flow of liquor across their boundaries despite potential
Commerce Clause objections. [citations omitted] There is not
a word in that history which indicates that Congress meant
to tamper in any way with First Amendment rights.15
The proponents of the alternative interpretation prefer to accept
the plain meaning of the amendment as it applies to commerce.16 The
LaRue Court's construction of the twenty-first amendment granting extremely broad powers to the states to regulate the use of intoxicants is
consistent with precedent and is largely based on this second view.
Consequently the majority of the cases dealing with the twenty-first
amendment relate to the surrender of federal power to the states largely
in the area of interstate commerce. If the original purpose can be accepted
as the desire to allow states to remain dry, abrogation of the commerce
clause as applied to intoxicating liquors was perhaps logically necessary
to effect that result.
The majority in LaRue, speaking through Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
relied heavily on several twenty-first amendment commerce clause cases
in justifying its decision. The Court cited State Board of Equalization v.
Young's Market Co.,' 7 which upheld the constitutionality of a California
was to shift control over the liquor traffic from the federal government, as the repository of
the police power under the eighteenth amendment, to the states.
14. The text of the Webb-Kenyon Act, omitting words irrelevant to the subject now
under consideration, reads as follows:

That the shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatsoever,
of any . . . intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one State or territory or district
of the United States . . . into any other . . . to be received, possessed, sold or in

any manner used . . . in violation of any law of such state, territory or district of
the United States . . . is hereby prohibited.

In support of an interpretation that the amendment was intended as an incorporation of
the Act, see, e.g., Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. R.R., 242 U.S. 311, 324 (1917);
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 336-39 (1964) (Black
dissenting); de Ganahl, The Scope of Federal Power over Alcoholic Beverages Since the
Twenty-First Amendment, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 819, 822-23 (1940) [hereinafter cited as
de Ganahl].
15. 93 S. Ct. at 405.
16. State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63-4 (1936)
(responding to the argument that the broad language of the twenty-first amendment is
limited by its history the Court replied that "Eals we think the language of the Amendment
is dear, we do not discuss these matters.").
17. 299 U.S. 59 (1936) [hereinafter referred to as Young's Market].
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statute imposing a license fee for the privilege of importing beer to any
place within its borders, which prior to the twenty-first amendment would
have been void as a direct burden on interstate commerce. The Court in
Young's Market held that since the adoption of the twenty-first amendment, a state was not required to let imported liquors compete with
domestic liquors on equal terms. The Court stated that to hold otherwise,
"would involve not a construction of the Amendment, but a rewriting
8
of it."'
Following this decision, the Court has, on numerous occasions, consistently held that the amendment bestowed upon the states broad regulatory power over the liquor traffic within their territories and that the
right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating
liquor is not limited by the commerce clause.19
The rationale employed by the Court to permit the twenty-first
amendment to override the commerce clause in previous cases, and to
some extent the first amendment in LaRue, is based on the premise that
the states, having the power to prohibit absolutely the manufacture, sale
or possession of intoxicants, irrespective of the time and place of production or prospective use, must be afforded great flexibility in prescribing
conditions under which its use may be regulated. 20 Under this interpretation the Court has sanctioned the regulation, 2' prohibition,2 2 discrimination,2" confiscation, 24 and taxation 25 of intoxicating liquors in apparent
disregard of the resultant balkanization of the trade in liquor among the
states.
While the Court admitted in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Hostetter,26 that the twenty-first amendment has not operated totally
to repeal the commerce clause in the area of liquor regulation, it stated
that
[w] e need not now decide whether the mode of liquor regulation
chosen by a State in such circumstances could ever constitute
so grave an interference with a company's operations elsewhere
27
as to make the regulation invalid under the Commerce Clause.
It is clear, then, that important constitutional restrictions on state powers
have been removed and that these state powers have been extended
beyond the ordinary bounds of the commerce clause.
18. Id.at 62.
19. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); Ziffrin, Inc.
v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939);
Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U.S. 391 (1939); Mahoney v.
Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938).
20. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939).
21. State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936).

22. Id.
23. Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938).
24. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
25. Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing

Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U.S. 391 (1939).
26. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
27. Id. at 42-3.
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As noted by Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissent in LaRue,28 the
amendment by its terms speaks only to state control of the transportation and importation of alcohol. States may prohibit completely the
manufacture of liquor within their borders and may prohibit or condition
its importation for delivery or use therein. However, the Court, in the
past, has refrained from extending the scope of the amendment beyond
these terms to situations in which the liquor is not brought into the state
for delivery or use therein. In Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co.,29
intoxicants were physically transported across California's territory to
Yosemite National Park, jurisdiction over which had been ceded by
California to the federal government. The Court held that "[t]here was
no transportation into California for 'delivery or use therein' .... Where
exclusive jurisdiction is in the'30 United States . . . the [Twenty-first]
Amendment is not applicable.

After its decision in Collins, the Court on two occasions 31 upheld
state regulations dealing with the transportation of intoxicating liquors
through the states. However, the Court held that the twenty-first amendment did not govern in such a situation and based its decision on traditional commerce clause grounds, finding that the regulations were within
the reasonable police power of the state and were reasonably necessary
to protect the local public interest.
A recent case, discussed by the Court in LaRue as supportive of
the broad sweep of the twenty-first amendment, is Hostetter v. Idlewild
Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 2 in which the Court found the twenty-first
amendment inapplicable and constitutionally insufficient to grant New
York the power to prohibit absolutely the passage of liquor through its
territory. In Hostetter, the petitioner, a New York liquor dealer, sold
tax-free liquor to passengers embarking for foreign destinations from
John F. Kennedy International Airport. Having been informed by the
New York State Liquor Authority that its business was illegal under
New York's Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, petitioner sought injunctive relief to restrain the Authority from interfering with its business.
The Court, in responding to the argument that the twenty-first amendment gives to the state complete and exclusive control over commerce
in intoxicating liquors, stated that:
28. 93 S. Ct. at 405.
29. 304 U.S. 518 (1938) [hereinafter referred to as Collins].
30. Id. at 538. Accord, Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944).
31. Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944), held that regulations applicable to transportation through Virginia required that (1) the vehicle must use the most direct route
and carry a bill of lading showing the route it will travel; (2) the carrier must post a
bond in the penal sum of $1,000 conditioned on lawful transportation; and (3) the bill of
lading must show the name of the true consignee. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred,
noting that while the legislation could not survive under the commerce clause alone, state
control over liquor had been extended by the twenty-first amendment. Duckworth v.
Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941), upheld a statute making it unlawful for anyone to ship
into the state any intoxicating liquor without first having obtained a permit from the
state commissioner of revenue. Mr. Justice Jackson concluded that the regulations in
question were not sustainable under the commerce clause alone.
32. 377 U.S. 324 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Hostetter].
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To draw a conclusion ... that the Twenty-first Amendment has
somehow operated to "repeal" the Commerce Clause wherever
regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would, however,
be an absurd oversimplification. . . . Such a conclusion would
be patently bizarre and is demonstrably incorrect....
Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce
Clause are parts of the same Constitution [and] each must be
considered in the light of the other ....88
The distinction that was drawn limiting the state's power was based on
the Court's finding that the ultimate delivery and use were not in New
York, but, rather, in a foreign country. The first major limitation, then,

on the twenty-first amendment's scope as a power source is the adherence
to the language of the amendment itself, requiring transportation into a
state for delivery or use therein.
Notwithstanding the fact that under the twenty-first amendment
the states have the power to regulate traffic in alcoholic beverages largely
unrestricted by the commerce clause, the Court has generally resisted
attempts by the states to compel Congress to surrender the power reserved to it by the export-import clause. 4 In Department of Revenue v.
James B. Beam Distilling Co.,35 petitioner, an importer of scotch whisky
from abroad, filed a claim for refund on a tax levied by Kentucky on
imported liquor, which was clearly contrary to the provisions of the
export-import clause. The Court, confronted again with conflicting provisions of the Constitution, noted that to sustain the tax would require
a holding that the "Twenty-first Amendment has completely repealed
the Export-Import Clause so far as intoxicants are concerned" 36 and
that "[n]othing in the language of the Amendment nor in its history
leads to such an extraordinary conclusion. 817 The Court seems to have
distinguished the result in Beam Distilling Co. from those cases overriding the commerce clause on the basis that the export-import clause
is "a constitutional provision which flatly prohibits any state from imposing a tax upon imports from abroad" as opposed to the commerce clause,
which merely provides Congress with "generalized authority." 8
The dichotomy presented here is one which appears to sanction the
classification of the separate clauses of the Constitution according to a
scale which rates as constitutionally inferior those which require judicial
33. Id. at 331-32.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its Inspection Laws."
35. 377 U.S. 341 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Beam Distilling Co.].

36. Id. at 345.
37. Id. at 345-46. See Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Comm.,
224 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1963), aff'd per curiam, 378 U.S. 124 (1964).
38. Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 344 (1964);

see generally Note, The Evolving Scope of State Power under the Twenty-first Amendment:
The 1964 Liquor Cases, 19 RuT ERs L. Rxv. 759, 775 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Evolving

Scope].
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interpretation. It has been observed that the equal protection, commerce,
and due process clauses, under which state retaliatory and regulatory
legislation have been challenged in the past are neither precise nor
explicit." Such a distinction is equally applicable to the first amendment,
subordinated by the Court in the instant case.
Germane to this discussion is the question of whether the Court in
refusing to apply the amendment to "through the state" liquor cases and
to export-import cases was doing so on the basis of a redefinition of the
terms "for delivery or use therein" or whether it was committing itself
to limiting the scope of state power granted by the amendment to the
extent that the result would be consistent with other constitutional
guidelines. LaRue seems to indicate that the latter is not the approach
adopted by the Court. While the cases indicating the prior approach
are not legion, there seems to be a willingness on the part of the Court
to subordinate not only first amendment freedoms, but also the due
process and equal protection clauses to the power of the states to regulate
the liquor industry in an arbitrary and often unreasonable manner.
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis in Young's
Market4 ° was apparently unconcerned with the legislation discriminating between domestic beer and beer imported from other states, when
it noted:
The claim that the statutory provisions and the regulations are
void under the equal protection clause may be briefly disposed
of. A classification recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment
cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth."1
The inapplicability of the equal protection clause has subsequently been
reaffirmed by the Court on numerous occasions.4"
Such decisions might be indicative of a tendency on the part of the
Court to permit the amendment to shift the supremacy of power were it
not for the Court's expressed reticence to do so. The Court in Young's
Market,43 having held that the state power sanctioned by the twenty-first
amendment was not subject to the constitutional limitations embodied
in the commerce clause and the due process clause, refused to hold that
the amendment had "freed the states from all restrictions upon the police
power to be found in other provisions of the Constitution.""4 A further
manifestation of the Court's intent not to eliminate completely such
39. Evolving Scope, supra note 38, at 775.
40. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
41. Id. at 64. See Skilton, State Power under the Twenty-first Amendment, 7 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 342, 352-54 (1938).

42. E.g., Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U.S. 391 (1939);
Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938). But see Clark Distilling Co. v.
Western Md. R.R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917), where the Court in upholding the constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act remarked that the government can forbid the manufacture and sale of liquor and regulate its traffic without violating the due process clause.
43. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).

44. Id. at 64.
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important constitutional restrictions on state power was evident in the
45 There, the Court invalidated a
case of Wisconsin v. Constantineau.
Wisconsin statute pursuant to which a notice was posted in all retail
liquor outlets in the city of Hartford that sales or gifts of liquor to the
petitioner were forbidden for one year. The rationale employed by the
Court in finding the statute unconstitutional was that, although the powers
of the states under the twenty-first amendment were extremely broad,
the characterization given a person by "posting" constituted such a
potential stigma that procedural due process required notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
In another recent decision where a black guest in a private club
was refused service of food and beverages because of his race, the Court
held that he was entitled to a decree enjoining the enforcement of regulations promulgated by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board insofar as
those regulations required compliance with the club's constitution and
by-laws which contained racially discriminating provisions."8 Given the
frequent fluctuations in the Court's disposition regarding fundamental
personal freedoms and the twenty-first amendment, it is not surprising
that the majority in LaRue4 7 cited Wisconsin v. Constantineau as supportive of the proposition that the prior decisions do not go so far as to
hold that the twenty-first amendment supersedes all other provisions of
the United States Constitution in the area of liquor regulations. The
obvious question, considering the two decisions above, was posed by
Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in LaRue when he pondered, "I am at a loss to understand why the Twenty-first Amendment
should be thought to override the First Amendment but not the Four48
teenth."1
Mr. Justice Marshall well describes the esteem and, perhaps, the
reverence in which our first amendment values have been held:
For almost two centuries, our country has taken singular pride
in the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution, and the
most cherished of those ideals have found expression in the
First Amendment.4 9
Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent presents a compelling argument that such
a "broadscale attack on First Amendment freedoms" requires a reorder45. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). The Court declared the statute unconstitutional as constituting
a denial of proceduraldue process. The Court has long refused to use substantive due process
to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, retaliatory or discriminatory. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966), citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963). Although a dead issue for many years, substantive due process as a viable
limitation has gained considerable life in the recent decision of Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705
(1973), where the Court held a Texas abortion statute unconstitutional under fourteenth
amendment substantive due process.
46. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972).
47. 93 S. Ct. at 395.

48. Id. at 406.
49. Id.
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ing of priorities. It is difficult to justify the Court's unwillingness to
limit the state's power to control the sale of alcoholic beverages when
refusal to do so required the subordination of these freedoms. In the
past, the Court has subordinated the enormous powers granted the states
by the twenty-first amendment to lesser federal enactments. Against the
twenty-first amendment, the Court has upheld labelling provisions contained in the Federal Alcohol Administration Act,50 prosecution based
on the Sherman Anti-trust Act, 5 government order based on the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, compelling numerous distilleries to
convert their operations from the manufacture of alcoholic beverages, 2
and congressional power to design such powers of inspection under the
liquor laws as it deems necessary."
The ratification of the twenty-first amendment resulted in a remarkable enlargement of state power and a fundamental change in the constitutional relationship between the states and the federal government
relating to the control of alcoholic beverages. The Court's decision in
Californiav. LaRue is a far cry from that which upheld the validity of
the Webb-Kenyon Act, upon which the twenty-first amendment was
based:
[T]he exceptional nature of the subject here regulated is the
basis upon which the exceptional power exerted must rest and
affords no ground for any fear that such power may be constitutionally extended to things which it may not, consistently
with the guaranties of the Constitution, embrace.54
The Court, in subordinating the first amendment to the twenty-first
amendment, has engaged in an unwarranted and unprecedented extension
of the scope of the language of the twenty-first amendment to include
all things remotely associated with "the transportation and importation"
of intoxicating beverages. It has clearly manipulated the language of
the amendment to endow the states with awesome powers.
The staggering ramifications for the twenty-first amendment, a
seemingly innocuous measure designed to enable states to control traffic
in liquor, long a subject of speculation, 5 as the Court has interpreted it,
are only now becoming apparent. If the Court is not to be limited by
the language of the amendment nor guided by its intended purpose, how
far and in what direction will the Court extend the scope of the states'
power unrestricted by the Constitution?
JEFFREY L. BERKOWITZ
50. William Jameson & Co., Inc. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939).
51. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
52. Dowling Bros. Distilling Co. v. United States, 153 F.2d 353 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
228 U.S. 848 (1946).
53. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
54. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. R.R. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 332 (1917).
55. de Ganahl, supra note 15, at 901.

